European powers collapsed from overtaxing their people for wealth they no longer had. The United States is headed for collapse for refusing to fairly tax existing concentrations of wealth.
The first thing you need to know about Goldman Sachs is that it's everywhere. The world's most powerful investment bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money. In fact, the history of the recent financial crisis, which doubles as a history of the rapid decline and fall of the suddenly swindled dry American empire, reads like a Who's Who of Goldman Sachs graduates.It's a fascinating look into a, if not the, major player in the lead up to our current financial debacle. Michael Lewis traces the root cause back even further. In an article called "The End" he takes us through the mortgage meltdown. But deep into the article, right at the end of it he talks about his lunch with John Gutfreund, the CEO of Salomon Brothers who turned it from a private partnership into Wall Street’s first public corporation. By doing this Gutfreund:
The bank's unprecedented reach and power have enabled it to turn all of America into a giant pumpanddump scam, manipulating whole economic sectors for years at a time, moving the dice game as this or that market collapses, and all the time gorging itself on the unseen costs that are breaking families everywhere — high gas prices, rising consumercredit rates, halfeaten pension funds, mass layoffs, future taxes to pay off bailouts. All that money that you're losing, it's going somewhere, and in both a literal and a figurative sense, Goldman Sachs is where it's going: The bank is a huge, highly sophisticated engine for converting the useful, deployed wealth of society into the least useful, most wasteful and insoluble substance on Earth — pure profit for rich individuals.
...and the other partners not only made a quick killing; they transferred the ultimate financial risk from themselves to their shareholders. It didn’t, in the end, make a great deal of sense for the shareholders. (A share of Salomon Brothers purchased when I arrived on the trading floor, in 1986, at a then market price of $42, would be worth 2.26 shares of Citigroup today—market value: $27.) But it made fantastic sense for the investment bankers.And the taxpayers were left, paying for it.
From that moment, though, the Wall Street firm became a black box. The shareholders who financed the risks had no real understanding of what the risk takers were doing, and as the risk-taking grew ever more complex, their understanding diminished. The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated the potential gains to be had by the investment bank as public corporation, the psychological foundations of Wall Street shifted from trust to blind faith.
No investment bank owned by its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine C.D.O.’s. I doubt any partnership would have sought to game the rating agencies or leap into bed with loan sharks or even allow mezzanine C.D.O.’s to be sold to its customers. The hoped-for short-term gain would not have justified the long-term hit.
...[Gutfreund] agreed that the main effect of turning a partnership into a corporation was to transfer the financial risk to the shareholders. “When things go wrong, it’s their problem,” he said—and obviously not theirs alone. When a Wall Street investment bank screwed up badly enough, its risks became the problem of the U.S. government. “It’s laissez-faire until you get in deep shit,” he said, with a half chuckle. He was out of the game.
Here is what I mean. Goldman Sachs knows that they are too big too fail. And they already know what the government does when a financial company is too big to fail. They bail them out -- no matter what.
What if Goldman took too many risks in making the absurd amount of money they're making now (while we're told that the banks don't have any money to lend)? What if they crashed right now? What do you think would happen?
Everyone in the world knows that we would bail them out. The idea that Tim Geithner would let Goldman go under is so laughable that it makes me sick. Does anyone trust that guy's impartiality (other than Obama)? Does anyone believe there is even a 1% chance that Geithner and Summers would let Goldman go down?
So, if you knew that no matter what level risk you took the government would always come riding to the rescue -- and that more risk equals more money in the short term -- wouldn't you take more risk? Of course you would.
"The biggest miscalculation made by the Clinton health care team was their bet that corporate executives would act out of corporate self-interest rather than class solidarity. If GM and Chrysler execs, and the execs of the other rustbelt companies with big legacy health-care costs, had acted in the interest of their shareholders and employees rather than in the interests of their business-school classmates and fellow high-bracket taxpayers, those two firms might not be bankrupt today, and we'd have a halfway-civilized health care finance system."
About 12.07 percent of all mortgages were delinquent or in foreclosure, up from 11.93 percent at the end of 2008.
Housing specialists said the number of foreclosures would probably keep rising as more people lose their jobs or are forced to trade full-time work for part-time. Nearly six million jobs have been lost since the recession began a year and a half ago, and many economists expect the unemployment rate to rise to 10 percent from its current 8.9 percent.
“More than anything else, this points to the impact of the recession and drops in employment on mortgage defaults,” Jay Brinkmann, chief economist of the Mortgage Bankers Association, said in a statement. “It does not appear the level of mortgage defaults will begin to fall until after the employment situation begins to improve.”
"Instead of “stating” my income without documenting it, I would take out a “no ratio” mortgage and not state my income at all. For the price of a slightly higher interest rate, American Home would verify my assets, but that was it. Because I wasn’t stating my income, I couldn’t have a debt-to-income ratio, and therefore, I couldn’t have too much debt. I could have had four other mortgages, and it wouldn’t have mattered. American Home was practically begging me to take the money.
"Despite the obvious red flag of applying for a Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell loan, I wasn’t paying that much for the money. The rate on my primary mortgage of $333,700 was a remarkably low 5.625 percent for the first five years, though my monthly payments would probably jump substantially after the fifth year. On top of that, I was paying a much higher rate of 8.5 percent on my “piggyback” loan for $80,300. Even so, I would be paying slightly more than $2,500 a month for the first five years. It would get expensive eventually, but I could worry about that later."
The Obama administration’s bank- rescue efforts will probably fail because the programs have been designed to help Wall Street rather than create a viable financial system, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
Rather than continually buying small stakes in banks, the government should put weaker banks through a receivership where the shareholders of the banks are wiped out and the bondholders become the shareholders, using taxpayer money to keep the institutions functioning, he said.
The Public-Private Investment Program, PPIP, designed to buy bad assets from banks, "is a really bad program," Stiglitz said. It won’t accomplish the administration’s goal of establishing a price for illiquid assets clogging banks’ balance sheets, and instead will enrich investors while sticking taxpayers with huge losses, he said.
"You’re really bailing out the shareholders and the bondholders."
The banksters who have emptied the US Treasury of its money continue the same games of accounting sleight of hand, financial engineering, and other tricks of the trade that helped cause the meltdown in the first place.
"But the $165 million in taxpayer funds used to reward them is but a sideshow in a far larger drama of moral decay swirling around the banking bailout. It should not distract from the many billions, not paltry millions, of our dollars being diverted to reward the very folks who brought us such misery. Consider the $12.8 billion of the $170 billion that taxpayers gave AIG in bailout funds that AIG then secretly diverted to Goldman Sachs, a company that evidently has a lock on both the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve no matter which political party is in power. It was the biggest payoff among those that AIG made to a score of foreign and domestic financial giants."
"the same banks, hedge funds and private equity firms responsible for the world financial meltdown keep their profits in those "secrecy spaces" -- alongside the ill-gotten gains of numerous drug dealers, dictators and delinquents of every description."
"According to the Government Accountability Office, nearly all of America's top 100 corporations maintain subsidiaries in countries identified as tax havens. As the GAO notes, there could be reasons other than avoiding the IRS to set up branches in places such as Singapore, Luxembourg and Switzerland, where taxes are light or nonexistent and keeping clients' illicit secrets is considered a matter of national pride."
[...]
"When the cost of these shenanigans was last estimated two years ago, the U.S. government's annual loss in revenue due to tax avoidance by major corporations and super-rich individuals was pegged at about $100 billion -- considerably more than a rounding error, even today. But of course that is only a rough assessment, as is the estimate of $12 trillion in untaxed assets hidden around the world. Nobody will know for certain until the books are opened and transparency is established."
"[T]he Geithner plan is not an alternative to nationalization: insolvent banks should be nationalized and the Geithner plan should not apply to them. But solvent banks still need to have their toxic assets disposed of; and for [these] banks the Geithner plan provides a solution that - all in all - is better than the alternative. Those who don't like the Geithner plan on the basis that they prefer nationalization are right - as I agree - that the insolvent banks should be nationalized. But they usually don't give an explanation of how they would dispose of the toxic assets of solvent banks. They seem not to like the Geithner plan because it would provide a subsidy to the investors. But ensuring participation of private investors in the risk and in the price revelation is worth that subsidy."
But if you think that the banks really, really have made lousy investments, this won’t work at all; it will simply be a waste of taxpayer money."
And Atrios says:
"The issue isn't that they're worthless, the issue is that they aren't worth nearly as much as the financial institutions are pretending they're worth. Sellers have a huge incentive to not sell at lower prices because lower prices will potentially reveal that they're insolvent/essentially bankrupt. ...[T]he reason that the big players can make money while the gov't loses money is because of the no recourse loans, and the asymmetric upside/downside of the Geithner plan. They're buying shitpile mostly with gov't loans, and if there's money to be made they and the gov't benefit. But if the asset is shit, they don't have to pay back the loan, just hand over the asset. All this encourages institutions to overpay, so we get to pretend shitpile isn't so shitty until the gov't eats the losses."
